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The general data protection 
regulation: a partial success for 
children on social network sites?
Karen Mc Cullagh*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Almost 20 years ago, the first social networking site (“SNS”) was launched 
in the U.S. Whilst developers originally intended for SNSs to be used by 
adults—which they are—they have also become an integral communication 
platform in the lives of many children in EU Member States. Sharing per-
sonal information on SNSs is now a routine activity for many children and, 
whilst they are computer literate in a way that their parents are often not, a 
number of concerns have emerged. One of these concerns is that children 
are vulnerable since they lack the capacity to consent to the terms of SNS 
membership agreements regarding the processing of their personal data. A 
further concern is that children’s naïve confidence sometimes leads them to 
take risks—by sharing information about themselves—that adults would 
not take. This is particularly concerning as children may be ignorant about 
the fact that their profile and behavioural data is sold to data brokers who 
use that information to produce targeted adverts—and that these adverts 
may display age inappropriate content or even may not by recognised by 
the children as adverts.1 
Directive 95/46/EC2 regulates the processing of the personal data of 
EU citizens, including personal data posted on SNSs. Problematically, it 
was drafted in a pre-SNS era and neither makes reference to children nor 
considers them vulnerable data subjects whose personal data should be 
subject to more stringent processing rules. The absence of specific legal 
protection for children’s data on SNSs sparked concerns that children were 
ignorantly disclosing personal data and being exposed to profiling and 
advertising without adequate privacy and data protection safeguards in place. 
In response to these concerns, provisions aimed at safeguarding children’s 
privacy and data protection rights have been included in Regulation (EU) 
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2016/679 (hereafter “GDPR”),3 which will come into force on 25 May 
2018. 
This chapter provides a critical evaluation of the forthcoming measures to 
address a knowledge gap that exists because of the novelty of these provisions 
and the fact that scholarship in this area is currently underdeveloped.4 
It begins by providing an overview of SNSs and the problems posed by 
underage children’s access to them. In this regard, it will illustrate that the 
biological and psychosocial developmental changes that children experience 
as they progress through their teenage years and develop their capacity 
for freedom of expression makes them vulnerable to impulsive personal 
information disclosures and privacy invasions. After this, an exploration 
of the current legal protections for children’s privacy on SNSs from the 
perspective of privacy as information control will highlight deficiencies 
in Directive 95/46/EC. This leads to an analysis of the measures in the 
GDPR to determine whether they will, when introduced, realise the twin 
goals of legitimising the processing of children’s personal data and, at the 
same time, protecting their fundamental privacy and data protection rights. 
The compatibility of measures in the GDPR with provisions in the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (“the UNCRC”) 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) 
(“the EU Charter”) is considered as these provide a normative framework 
for evaluating children’s legal rights. To comply with both legal frameworks, 
data protection measures in the GDPR governing children’s activities on 
SNSs should recognise their evolving capacity for freedom of expression 
and privacy. This would allow them to express themselves with appropriate 
safeguards in place, ensuring that their best interests are protected and that 
they are not subject to economic exploitation through activities such as 
profiling and advertising without consent. Specifically, the analysis presents 
a critical evaluation of the introduction of an age threshold, below which 
children are deemed to lack capacity to consent to the processing of their 
personal data; the conceptual coherence of relying on parental consent for 
children under the threshold age; the practical implications of Member 
States being permitted to set the threshold age within a range of ages; and 
the practical challenges posed by relying on verified parental consent. 
The chapter concludes that measures in the GDPR are compatible 
with provisions in the UNCRC and the EU Charter but that a number of 
practical challenges remain unsolved. For instance, allowing Member States 
to set the threshold age means that the goal of simplifying and harmonising 
the regulatory environment for SNSs operating on a transnational basis 
will not be fully realised. Equally, reliance on parental consent and the 
consent of children over the threshold age is conceptually coherent, but it 
is dependent on the introduction of low-cost age-verification mechanisms 
being integrated into SNSs. It is also dependent on child data subjects (or 
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their parents) being digitally literate enough to give unambiguous, specific 
consent to the processing of their personal data. Relatedly, whilst the GDPR 
includes measures to promote and increase the digital literacy of both parents 
and children, it remains to be seen how effective these will be in practice. 
For these reasons, the GDPR is an improvement on Directive 95/46/EC, 
but only a partial success. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK 
SITES
Boyd and Ellison define SNSs as “web-based services that allow individuals 
to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) 
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within 
the system.”5 Members create profiles populated with their personal data 
(for example, their name, age, sex, location and marital status) alongside 
a picture and other details about themselves (for example, their favourite 
movie; which football team they support; which music and films they like; 
which events they will attend; where they work, or attend(ed) school; and 
their religious and political affiliations). They can also provide frequent 
status updates, broadcasting to those in their network what they are doing, 
how they are feeling, what they like and other personal details. By so doing, 
they can communicate with friends, and, if they choose, with individuals 
not personally known to them so that, over time, they become part of an 
online community of people with common interests. 
The first social network site of this type, SixDegrees.com, launched 
in 1997. Since then, a huge number of social networks sites have emerged 
(e.g. Facebook, iWiW, Myvip, Nasza-klasa and Tuenti) and have attracted 
a huge number of members. As of July 2015, there were an estimated 2.3 
bn. active SNS members.6 Across the globe, one SNS dominates: Facebook, 
which has over 1.4 bn. registered members across the globe, of whom an 
estimated 7.5m. are children are younger than 13.7 Indeed, a survey of 
European children aged 9–16 found that Facebook was the most popular 
SNS in 17 out of 25 EU Member States and the second-most popular in 
another 5 Member States surveyed.8 The meteoric growth and popularity 
of SNSs across all age groups is attributable to the ease with which they 
facilitate self-expression and socialisation. By enabling members to share 
content that they have produced themselves and to receive content from 
others, SNSs encourage members to keep in touch with friends and relatives, 
to meet new people through interaction with friends of existing SNS friends, 
and join SNS groups with common interests. 
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A.  CHILDREN’S “GROWING” PRESENCE ON SNSs 
Children in EU Member States are using the internet ‘at ever younger 
ages’9 and join SNSs to be creative, communicate, play, and to establish 
and maintain friendship and relationship bonds.10 Indeed, 26% of 9–10 
year olds in the EU have an SNS profile11 and participation increases as 
children progress through their teenage years—82% of 15–16 year olds in 
the EU have an SNS profile.12
Despite the development of SNSs that are specifically designed for 
and aimed at children (such as ClubPenguin, Dgamer, WebKinz and 
Whyville), SNSs such as Facebook—which were originally intended to be 
used by adults only (in Faceboook’s case, membership was initially limited 
to Harvard University students)—have become popular amongst all age 
groups, including children. One reason for this is that these sites are more 
widely known  whereas levels of awareness of child-specific SNSs are lower. 
Another pertinent explanation for children’s presence on SNSs designed for 
adult members is that they offer greater functionality. For example, Club 
Penguin limits what members can say to a predefined menu of greetings, 
questions and statements, as well as emotes, actions and greeting cards, 
and blocks attempts to communicate a phone number or other personally 
identifiable information, whereas Facebook does not. During adolescence, 
teenagers frequently experiment with their identity as their sense of freedom 
of expression, selfhood and independence grows.13 A profile on an SNS 
such as Facebook provides a platform for experimentation, in that it allows 
children to present their thoughts and personal images to a captive, interested 
audience. In selectively choosing what information to disclose to others, 
teenagers are able to influence how others perceive them and refine their 
own sense of identity. Such is the popularity of these sites that children fear 
social exclusion from their peer group if they are not members. Indeed, peer 
pressure from other children often results in parents being coerced by their 
children to give permission to join SNSs and, in some instances, to assist 
in the registration process, even though the child is underage (U.S.-owned 
SNSs such as Facebook have set the minimum membership age at 13 to 
comply with U.S. law14 namely, the Children's Online Privacy Protection 
Act 1998, hereafter 'COPPA".). For instance, a U.K.-based IT law expert 
has confessed that “I found myself readily conspiring with the parent of 
a 10-year-old to find a way past a block on the child’s access to Google 
Hangout, where it was clear that all her friends were already registered and 
that it would be ‘the end of worthwhile life’ if she did not get back on.”15 
The combined effect of an individual child’s desire to socialise through 
sharing personal information and the peer pressure to be socially present 
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means that sharing of personal information on SNSs has become a routine 
daily activity for many children in EU Member States. 
B.  SNSs—PRIVACY AS “INFORMATION CONTROL”
Before evaluating the adequacy of both the current and the forthcoming 
legal measures for protecting EU children’s privacy, it is necessary to explain 
what is meant by privacy in the context of SNSs, since the act of posting 
personal information—including one’s name, date of birth, relationship 
status, hobbies, and photos which reveal information either explicitly (e.g. 
gender) or implicitly (e.g. sexual orientation or religious affiliation)—may 
seem to conflict with notions of privacy. Privacy is a nebulous, contested, 
philosophical concept used to describe the legal protection afforded to 
variety of interests including “the right to be let alone”;16 limited access to 
the self;17 secrecy (the concealment of certain matters from others);18 per-
sonhood (the protection of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity);19 
intimacy (the control over, or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships 
or aspects of life);20 and, in the context of data protection laws, the ability 
to exercise control over information about oneself. Accordingly, in this 
chapter, the protection of children’s privacy interests on SNSs is considered 
from the perspective of privacy as “information control” or “informational 
self-determination”.21 Westin defined information control privacy as: 
“The claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others … [it is] the desire of people 
to choose freely under what circumstances and to what extent 
they will expose themselves, their attitude and their behaviour 
to others.”22
Thus, children exercise both their freedom of expression23 and privacy24 
rights when they decide what personal information to share, and with 
whom, on SNSs and only suffer a privacy invasion when they lose control 
over their information. In the context of SNSs, members control their 
personal data by giving or withholding consent to processing by SNSs and 
third parties. 
III.  INADEQUACIES OF DIRECTIVE 
95/46/EC 
Directive 95/46/EC was drafted before SNSs were invented so it neither 
anticipated nor provides for the particular privacy and data protection is-
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sues caused by this technology. Whilst the UN had completed the UNCRC 
in 1989, not all EU Member States had ratified it by the time the text of 
Directive 95/46/EC was agreed, with the effect that children’s rights were 
not fully fledged. As a result, Directive 95/46/EC neither makes reference 
to children nor considers them data subjects whose personal data should 
be subject to more stringent processing rules. However, in recent years, a 
number of child-specific privacy and data protection problems have emerged 
from SNSs, as set out below.
A.  CONSENT—THE ABSENCE OF A “CAPACITY” 
ASSESSMENT 
The processing of adult and child SNS members’ personal data by SNSs, 
data brokers and advertisers is all permitted on the same basis—namely the 
Directive 95/46/EC, arts. 2(h) and 7 requirements that the data subject has 
unambiguously given consent. Accordingly, SNS members do not suffer 
a privacy invasion when their information is processed lawfully—that is, 
when they freely give specific and informed consent to the processing of 
their personal data. 
For children to give unambiguous consent to personal data processing, 
they must, however, have the requisite capacity to understand the terms 
of service and privacy notices on SNS sites (Facebook, for example, refer 
to its terms of service as a “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities”25). 
Since SNSs were originally designed for adults, the language used in privacy 
notices and terms of service are typically too complex for children to 
understand.26 Moreover, children who might naturally turn to their parents 
for assistance and explanation frequently cannot do so as Bonneau and 
Priebusch’s analysis of multiple SNS privacy policies found “great diversity 
in the length and content of formal privacy policies”27 and, significantly, that 
“almost all policies are not accessible to ordinary users due to obfuscating 
legal jargon”.28 In other words, they are usually written in such opaque, 
impenetrable legalese that most adults struggle to comprehend them. Worse 
than that, the lengthy and complex nature of these documents dissuades 
SNS members from reading them—a recent Eurobarometer survey of adults 
in EU Member States found that 56% of internet and online-platform 
users do not read terms and conditions and a further 18% read them but 
do not take them into account.29 Clearly, if a parent has neither read, nor 
understood, nor taken into account an SNS’s privacy policy, they cannot 
explain it to their child—arguably invalidating any purported consent given 
by the child. Equally, if a child cannot understand the complex terms in such 
notices then they cannot give unambiguous consent to the processing of their 
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personal data.30 Relatedly, if a child lacks the knowledge or understanding 
of data protection rules then they are unlikely to appreciate that SNSs are 
processing their personal data when they post it online, nor are they likely 
to appreciate that some personal data is considered “sensitive” and should 
be subject to more stringent processing conditions (for example, if they 
upload a photo of a Hanukkah celebration).31 
B.  THE VERIFIABLE AGE PROBLEM 
In an attempt to avoid the difficulties associated with establishing children’s 
unambiguous consent to the processing of their personal data, SNS data 
controllers have sought to forbid children from accessing SNSs by setting 
minimum age requirements for membership. However, the minimum age 
set by SNSs varies across EU Member States because of the absence of 
child-specific provisions in Directive 95/46/EC. Only one EU Member 
State (Spain) used the leeway available to Member States when transposing 
the Directive’s provisions into national law to include a minimum age—in 
this case, 14 years old, beyond which a child can validly consent to the 
processing of their personal data in national law.32 As a result, the Spanish-
owned SNS Tuenti has set the minimum membership age at 14 years old. 
No other Member State established such an age limit. Consequently, as 
EU-owned SNSs emerged, and U.S.-owned SNSs spread into EU Member 
States, variations in minimum ages arose, with 13 being the most common 
minimum age—reflecting the fact that the U.S.-owned SNS Facebook has 
set the minimum membership age at 13 to comply with COPPA. 
Although SNSs stipulate that they forbid membership of underage 
users, they do not usually require age and identity verification or express 
parental consent as a precondition to the registration of an account by 
children. Rather, they rely on self-certification by children to prove that they 
are over the permitted age—e.g. through tick-boxes or date of birth entry 
boxes that reject under-age entries. Some sites never actually ask the user 
to confirm their birth date, relying instead on a statement in their terms 
and conditions: “You must be at least 13 years old to use the Service.” SNSs 
such as Facebook have, however, admitted that current measures to identify 
and prevent access by underage users are not wholly successful because 
children lie about their age: “There are people who lie, there are people 
who are under 13 accessing Facebook. Facebook removes 20,000 people a 
day, people who are under-age.”33 Verifying the age of those under 18 also 
poses practical challenges:
“[T]here are not really mechanisms in most Western societies to 
verify whether you are a kid; they are all geared towards verifying 
that you are an adult, whether with a driver’s licence or some-
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thing else. So we do things like ‘age gating’, so that if you put in 
the wrong age once, a cookie on your machine will block you. 
We also, through algorithms, try to detect patterns of speech 
and things that look like you are not likely to be over 13, and we 
remove people. We also take complaints from teachers or other 
people in the network that you are involved in if you do not be-
long there, and we remove people.”34
Unsurprisingly, a survey of European children aged 9–16 found that 38% 
of 9–12 year olds and 77% of 13–16 year olds have an SNS profile, despite 
the imposition of minimum age membership restrictions.35 U.K. statistics 
confirmed a similar pattern with 72% of 10–18 year olds (and 49% of 
under-13 year olds) having a Facebook profile—and 78% of 10–12 year 
olds in the U.K. having a social media account of some kind.36 Evidently, 
there are many underage children on SNSs whose lack of understanding 
of the terms of service and privacy notices means that they cannot lawfully 
consent to the processing of their personal data. 
C.  DATAFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS, 
PROFILING & ADVERTISING
A further problem is that SNS members (both adults and children) who 
have either not read or not understood the terms and conditions or privacy 
policies tend to lack awareness that whilst SNSs are “free” in the sense 
that they typically do not have membership or subscription fees, they are 
advertisement-supported communication mediums that profit from the “da-
tafication of relationships.” “Datafication” refers to “the ability of networked 
platforms to render into data many aspects of the world that have never 
been quantified before—not just demographic or profiling data yielded by 
customers in (online) surveys, but automatically derived metadata from 
smart phones such as time stamps and GPS-inferred locations”.37 In other 
words, SNSs can collect, analyse and sell prodigious amounts of personal 
data generated by its members to data brokers and specialised data analytics 
and metrics companies who use the profile and behavioural data to produce 
personalised, targeted, adverts.38 
A particularly problematic aspect of this business model is that it 
encourages SNSs and third parties to collect information using surreptitious 
techniques, e.g. through “likes” and quizzes. Children (and indeed most 
adults) are unlikely to be aware that inferences can be made from their 
disclosures—for instance, that “liking” curly fries on Facebook is indicative 
of high intelligence39 or that “likes” can be used to predict race or sexual 
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orientation with a high degree of accuracy40—and that both disclosed 
and inferred information can be used to generate profiles and produce 
targeted adverts. The exposure of children to highly impactful personalised 
advertisements has heightened concerns about the “commercialisation” of 
childhood.41 
Additionally, one of the ways in which advertisers operate on social 
network sites is through “advergames”—online video games created in 
order to promote a brand, product or organisation through an immersive 
marketing message within a game. For example, the Krave Krusader game 
was used to promote cereal to Facebook members.42 Whilst advertisers do 
use measures such as adult verification schemes (also known as age gating) 
to try to prevent underage children from being exposed to age-inappropriate 
advergames, children who have provided false age details to SNSs are equally 
likely to have the wherewithal to fool age-gating mechanisms. This is 
problematic as research has confirmed that some children as old as 15 do not 
recognise advergames as advertisements, reinforcing persistent fears about 
children who lack capacity being unwittingly exposed to and influenced by 
highly impactful advertising.43 
A related, but unintended, consequence of children being on SNSs 
intended for adults is that they are exposed to age-inappropriate advertisement 
content. For instance, a small-scale study by the U.K. Advertising Standards 
Authority found that age-restricted adverts (e.g. for alcohol) were viewed 
by under-18 SNS members despite the advertisers efforts to prevent 
this—primarily because children presented false age information to SNSs 
when registering for membership.44 Similarly, a recent EU Commission 
sponsored study found that children were exposed to child-inappropriate 
(commercial) content, sexual content and alcohol-related advertisements.45 
This is problematic because research on adolescent psychological and 
neurobiological development indicates that many adolescents “look to 
advertising models to identify adult-only products and activities that will 
help them to project a more mature and positive self image and to boost their 
self esteem.”46 It has further confirmed that adolescents are more prone to 
making poor decisions when emotionally aroused. Since digital marketing 
“purposefully evokes high emotional arousal and urges adolescents to make 
consumption decisions under high arousal, it exacerbates this problem.”47 
The silence of Directive 95/46/EC on issues such as online behavioural 
advertising and profiling constitutes a threat to children’s autonomy, dignity 
and ability to control their personal information. Thus, there was a need to 
introduce a Regulation to speak to and address these issues.
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D.  EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE INADEQUACIES
In summary, Directive 95/46/EC and related national data protection laws 
were considered problematic because they did not provide adequate privacy 
and data protection safeguards for children on SNSs. Also, inconsistent 
transposition of the Directive’s provisions into Member States national laws 
gave rise to multiple regulatory-compliance burdens for SNSs operating on 
a transnational basis, resulted in unevenly applied protection for children 
and undermined the EU’s internal market goal of harmonised legislation. 
Consequently, there were calls for reform of Directive 95/46/EC and for it 
to be replaced by a Regulation to give individuals the operational means to 
ensure that they are fully informed about what happens to their personal 
data and enable them to exercise their rights more effectively, with specific 
additional provisions to safeguard the privacy and personal data of children. 
IV.  IMPETUS FOR THE 
INTRODUCTION OF THE GDPR 
The GDPR seeks to realise the political and economic goals of “help[ing 
to] stimulate the Digital Single Market in the EU by fostering consumer 
trust in online services and legal certainty for businesses based on clear and 
uniform rules.”48 The European Commission recognised that personal data 
is a highly valuable economic asset—such is its value that it is sometimes 
referred to as the “oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital 
world.”49 For instance, the European Commission has confirmed that “the 
value of European citizens’ personal data has the potential to grow to nearly 
€1 trillion annually by 2020.”50 [Emphasis in original.] Its increasing eco-
nomic value means that personal data is fast becoming a valuable resource 
in the 21st century—one from which SNSs will seek to harvest and profit. 
The collection and processing of personal data for profiling and advertising 
purposes is already a hugely profitable business model. Facebook earned an 
estimated $8.3 bn. from advertising in 201551 and forecasts suggest that by 
2017 global SNS advertisement spending will reach $35.98 bn.52 
Despite the keenness to exploit the economic potential of personal data, 
in November 2011, the then EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, 
expressed concern about the growth of digital advertising and the lack of 
public understanding that it is contingent on the harvesting and analysis 
of personal information.53 Thus, one of the chief concerns during the 
consultation process to replace Directive 95/46/EC with the GDPR was the 
growth of SNSs such as Facebook and how data protection rules applied to 
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them. The European Commission recognised that SNSs offer both economic 
opportunities for businesses and creative communication and expression 
opportunities for individuals. Any revision of Directive 95/46/EC should 
therefore seek to create an enabling environment for such activities that 
legitimises the processing of such personal data whilst also affording effective 
privacy and data protection to SNS members (including an exemption for 
individuals using social network sites in a personal capacity54). 
In addition, there was support for the introduction of specific rules 
to strengthen the data protection measures available to children as a 
Eurobarometer survey of European citizens had confirmed that 95% of 
Europeans “believe that under-age children should be specially protected from 
the collection and disclosure of personal data” and 96% agreed that “minors 
should be warned of the consequences of collecting and disclosing personal 
data.”55 [Emphasis in original.]
The European Commission had also previously noted that children 
need special protection because research had confirmed that children may 
be “less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and rights in relation to 
the processing of personal data.”56 Furthermore, self-regulatory initiatives 
such as the Safer Social Networking Principles for the EU and the Coalition 
To Make The Internet A Better Place For Kids have proven only partially 
successful.57 These initiatives were developed in furtherance of the European 
Commission’s European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children which 
aimed to give children greater protection from violations of their privacy 
and the potential abuse of their personal information.58
Moreover, although children’s human rights were not fully fledged 
when Directive 95/46/EC was introduced, they have, in recent years, been 
integrated into the legal framework of Member States. For instance, all 
EU Member States have ratified the UNCRC, which grants all children a 
comprehensive set of rights in recognition of the fact that they are vulnerable 
and in need of protection from exploitation. By ratifying it, all EU Member 
States have agreed to make all laws, policy and practices compatible with 
it (although a child cannot bring legal proceedings relying only on the 
UNCRC, courts, tribunals, and other administrative bodies should refer it 
to it when making decisions that affect children). 
The UNCRC defines a child as “every human being below the age 
of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier.”59 It recognises children as both “being” and “becoming” 
privacy rights holders.60 The right to privacy for children is recognised in art. 
16, and when art. 16 is read in conjunction with art. 3(1)—which stipulates 
that, in all actions concerning children, “the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration”—or art. 5—which provides that parents are 
responsible for providing appropriate direction and guidance to children “in 
a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child”—it is clear 
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that children are also “becoming” rights holders in the sense that as they 
mature they develop the capacity to manage decisions relating to their right 
to privacy. This dual status was recognised by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in 
In re S61 where he stated that a “judicious balance” had to be struck between 
recognising that “children are human beings in their own right” but that 
“a child is, after all, a child.”62 Other notable provisions in the UNCRC 
include art. 18(1), which obliges States to recognise that parents have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of children, 
and art. 18(2), which obliges States to provide appropriate assistance to 
parents. Also, art. 32 obliges States to “recognize the right of the child to be 
protected from economic exploitation” and must, under art. 32(c), provide 
for appropriate penalties or other sanctions. Collectively, these provisions 
seek to strike a delicate balance in recognising children as privacy rights 
holders who, in some circumstances, are also “becoming” rights holders 
and are in need of protection from harms like economic exploitation if they 
lack the capacity to give unambiguous consent to the processing of their 
personal data. The Court of Justice of the European Union has expressly 
recognised the need to respect children’s rights and requires EU law to take 
due account of the UNCRC.63 
Furthermore, in 2009, the EU Commission marked the 20th 
anniversary of the UNCRC by endorsing the promotion and protection 
of children’s rights as a policy priority.64 Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty imposes 
upon the EU, when exercising its competences, an obligation to promote 
the protection of the rights of the child.65 The Lisbon Treaty introduced 
amendments to Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the effect of 
which is that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, 
having the same status as primary EU law. 
The EU Charter enshrines certain political, social, and economic rights 
for EU citizens and residents into EU law. For instance, art. 7 sets out a 
right to privacy, art. 8 sets out a right to data protection and art. 11 provides 
a right to freedom of expression. Specifically in relation to children, the 
Charter, art. 24(1) states that children have the right to the protection and 
care necessary for their well-being and that their views shall be “taken into 
consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age 
and maturity”. Meanwhile, art. 24(2) states that that “[i]n all actions relating 
to children … the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.” 
Institutions of the EU and its Member States must legislate in compliance 
with the Charter and the EU’s courts will strike down legislation adopted 
by the EU’s institutions that contravenes it. 
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V.  THE GDPR: INFLUENCE AND 
IMPACT OF LOBBYING 
Important arguments have been, and are continuing to be, made regarding 
whether the decision to extend participation in the personal data economy is 
in children’s best interests,66 particularly as “the realization of children’s rights 
is not an automatic consequence of economic growth and business enterprises 
can also negatively impact children’s rights.”67 In this Part, the success of the 
GDPR is considered by assessing the extent to which it complies with the 
principles and provisions in the UNCRC and the EU Charter, as these 
provide a normative framework for evaluating children’s legal rights. The 
discussion will illustrate that the GDPR is ambitious in that it the first EU 
legal instrument to afford specific privacy and data protection to children, 
whilst also legitimising the processing of their personal data so that data 
controllers and third parties can realise its economic value in furtherance 
of the goals of the Digital Single Market. The analysis below will, however, 
illustrate that measures concerning children in the GDPR were shaped, and 
arguably weakened, through intense lobbying by industry representatives 
who were keen to maintain the legal and business status quo, and further 
that EU lawmakers are, to an extent, responsible for allowing this to hap-
pen because they did not make use of available mechanisms, such as impact 
assessments, to inform the law-making process.
A.  RECOGNITION OF CHILDREN’S 
VULNERABILITY AND EVOLVING CAPACITY  
TO CONSENT 
In recognition of children’s vulnerability due to their evolving capacity to 
understand and consent to the processing of their personal data, the first 
draft of the GDPR released by the European Commission in January 201268 
observed, in recital 29, that “[c]hildren deserve specific protection of their 
personal data, as they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards 
and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data.” It further 
proposed to draw upon the UNCRC, art. 1 definition of a child of “every 
human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier.” The proposal triggered submis-
sions from industry representatives, including the American Chamber of 
E-Commerce to the European Union69 and Facebook,70 that the age of a 
child be lowered from the age of 18 to 13 on the basis that “[a] threshold 
of 13 years of age for a child reflects more accurately the prevailing standard 
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in Europe (though there are some variations).”71 In response, a revised draft 
of the GDPR published by the Council on 4 December 201572 removed 
reference to the UNCRC definition of children as those under 18 years of 
age. Lobbying by industry representatives to maintain the threshold age of 
13 set by the dominant SNS provider, Facebook, was to be expected since 
raising the threshold age would increase their compliance burden and po-
tentially reduce their membership base. 
The first draft of the GDPR released by the European Commission in 
January 2012 further proposed in art. 8 that, “in relation to the offering of 
information society services directly to a child, the processing of personal data 
of a child below the age of 13 years shall only be lawful if and to the extent that 
consent is given or authorised by the child’s parent or custodian.” [Emphasis 
added.] A related Impact Assessment created as a Commission Staff Working 
Paper indicated that the proposal to set the age of consent at 13, below 
which parental authorisation would be required, took “inspiration for the 
age limit from the current US Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
and are not expected to impose undue and unrealistic burden upon providers 
of online services and other controllers.”73 Industry representatives were 
naturally supportive of this proposal since a harmonised age would reduce 
the compliance burden for SNSs operating across multiple jurisdictions. For 
instance, the Advertising Education Forum reported that “[c]hildren should 
be defined as under 13, according to international and EU best practice.”74 
Similarly, an article in Games Industry noted that an age limit of 13 would 
bring EU law into line with the age set in the U.S. under COPPA, stating 
that “[t]his will bring the EU’s data protection regime more closely in line 
with the US’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 which places 
similar requirements on any company that wishes to process any personal 
information relating to a child under the age of 13 years.”75
Given that problems with age-related content provisions in COPPA 
1998 are widely known,76 the apparent willingness of EU legislators to adopt 
similar provisions without scrutinising whether they were appropriate and 
fit for purpose seems flawed. However, to the surprise of many, the revised 
draft of the GDPR published by the Council on 4 December 2015, art. 8 
proposed to set the threshold age at a higher age of 16: 
“[I]n relation to the offering of information society services di-
rectly to a child, the processing of personal data of a child below the 
age of 16 years shall only be lawful if and to the extent that such 
consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility 
over the child.” [Emphasis added.]
The proposed higher age limit drew a torrent of criticism from industry rep-
resentatives and child protection experts such as Janice Richardson, former 
coordinator of European Safer Internet Network, on the basis that “moving 
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the requirement for parental consent from age 13 to age 16 would deprive 
young people of educational and social opportunities in a number of ways, 
yet would provide no more (and likely even less) protection.”77 Similarly, 
Larry Magid, chief executive of ConnectSafely.org, expressed concern that 
it would result in “banning a very significant percentage of youth and es-
pecially the most vulnerable ones who will be unable to obtain [parental] 
consent for a variety of reasons” from social network sites.78
The common theme of criticism from these child protection experts 
was that the proposed threshold age was too high, with the effect that 
some 16-year-old children who had the capacity to understand terms of 
service and consent to the processing of their personal data by SNSs would 
be denied the opportunity to do so because they were deemed in law to 
lack capacity—instead being forced to seek parental consent to join SNSs. 
Consequently, a further revised text was hastily issued and agreed upon 
by the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission on 15 
December 2015.79 The revised text, in art. 8(1), appears, in response to the 
criticisms and complaints about the introduction of a threshold age of 16, 
to make a concession by setting the default threshold age at 16 but allowing 
individual member states to set their own limit, with 13 being the lowest 
option. The final text of the GDPR, art. 8(1) reads:
“[I]n relation to the offer of information society services directly 
to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall be law-
ful where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is below 
the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the 
extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental 
responsibility over the child. 
Member States may provide by law for a lower age for those pur-
poses provided that such lower age is not below 13 years.” [Emphasis 
added.]
Notably, and much to the disappointment of civil society and child pro-
tection experts,80 neither the Commission nor the Council conducted an 
impact assessment to consider the implications of including or exclud-
ing an age-based definition of children in the GDPR 2016/679—or the 
merits of setting the threshold age at 13, 16 or any age in between those 
two ages. Instead, the threshold age of consent appears to have been influ-
enced by the representations of industry lobbyists rather than fact-based, 
impact-assessment evidence. This is problematic as capacity to consent to 
data processing by SNSs should not vary on a country-by-country basis 
since there is no obvious reason why children should mature more or less 
quickly in different countries. The fact that there are differences in the age 
of consent is a reflection of differing historical and cultural attitudes to child 
maturity rather than a modern-day evidence-informed approach to capac-
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ity—and it is an approach that EU Member States are being challenged to 
reconsider through ratification and adoption of the UNCRC principles. 
An opportunity to do so in the context of data protection laws has arguably 
been wasted due to the failure of the Commission or Council to seek an 
impact assessment on the merits and implications of setting a threshold age 
below 18. On a more positive note, recital 58 and art. 12 seek to address 
the problem of terms of service and privacy notice being written in complex 
legalese by requiring that information and communications regarding the 
processing of children’s data “should be in such a clear and plain language 
that the child can easily understand” (recital 58). This will assist children 
who are over the default age of consent yet under 18 who might otherwise 
struggle to comprehend terms of services and privacy notices. It will also 
increase the likelihood that they will be in a position to form the requisite 
consent to the collection and use of their personal data by enabling them 
to understand and assess whether or not the perceived benefit of using the 
SNS is worth the privacy trade-off.
It remains to be seen whether individual lawmakers in Member States 
will conduct impact assessments and seek independent, research-informed 
evidence when setting the threshold age in their countries. As outlined 
above, research has already confirmed that some children under the age 
of 15 do not have the mental capacity to identify advergames as a form of 
advertisement,81 providing a rationale for Member States to seek impact 
assessments on the merits of setting the default age of consent at 15 years of 
age or higher. It is to be hoped that individual Member States will conduct 
impact statements since doing so without an evidence-based rationale has 
the potential to result in the default age being set either set too low or too 
high to adequately reflect the capacity of children. If it is set too high, 
e.g. at 16, it may have the unintended consequence of creating a conflict 
of interest between parents and children by requiring parents to violate 
their children’s privacy during the later adolescent years when they have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy from their parents. Equally, where the 
default age is set too low, e.g. at 13, when the child does not have the 
maturity and mental capacity to comprehend terms of service and privacy 
notices, then the child is likely to be exposed to privacy and data protection 
harms. 
A threshold age of consent: individual assessment v age fixed in law
Through the introduction of a threshold age-of-consent requirement, the 
GDPR seeks to give effect to the “evolving capacities” model of “being” and 
“becoming” privacy rights holders set out in both the UNCRC and the EU 
Charter. Application of the evolving capacities model to consent to personal 
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data processing in the context of SNSs would result in a graduated approach 
to consent. Under this approach, very young children would be deemed 
to lack the capacity to consent to the processing of their personal data but 
parents (or those with parental responsibility) would be empowered to give 
consent on their behalf. As for older children, their capacity to consent to 
the processing of their personal data on SNSs would be determined on an 
individual basis by an independent body, e.g. a national regulator, psycholo-
gist or children’s commissioner. During the negotiation phase of agreeing 
the text of the GDPR, calls were made by the European NGO Alliance for 
Child Safety Online (“eNACSO”) and others82 for children’s consent to the 
processing to be determined on an individual basis because—
“[i]t seems unlikely that fixing a single age for ‘privacy maturity’ 
in relation to everything that happens between childhood and 
adulthood is going to be the right answer to the online privacy 
challenge. Between the ages of 12 and 18 young people do a lot 
of growing up, and different privacy standards or parental con-
sent standards should be applied to persons of different ages or 
in relation to different types of activity undertaken at different 
ages within that span.”83 
However, it would not be practical or feasible to require a court or independ-
ent regulator to assess a child’s capacity each time a child subscribes to an 
SNS or other information society service that processed their personal data. 
eNACSO conceded that even if the SNS operators agreed to undertake the 
task of assessing capacity themselves, it would not prove politically accept-
able nor would it provide a practical solution. The “evolving capacities” 
concept was developed when the working assumption was that every child 
could be seen and individually assessed by a person competent to make an 
informed decision about the child, but that does not reflect the reality of 
the internet:
“In remote environments such as the internet for now and the 
foreseeable future that is a practical impossibility. And even if it 
was not, the ability of, say, private companies to make such in-
timate assessments would raise major concerns about how and 
where the information thus obtained might be stored, who might 
have access to it and for what purposes?”84
Accordingly, instead of requiring an independent body to assess the capacity 
of a child, the GDPR stipulates that children who have attained the thresh-
old age, fixed in law by the Member State in which the child lives, have the 
capacity to consent to the processing of their personal data. Concomitantly, 
children below the threshold age are deemed to lack capacity to consent 
to the processing of their personal data and an onus is placed on those 
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with parental responsibility for children below that age to give or withhold 
consent to children accessing such sites. In so doing, the GDPR seeks to 
give effect to a modified but fit for purpose application of the “evolving 
capacities” model of “being” and “becoming” privacy rights holders set out 
in both the UNCRC and the EU Charter. 
B.  PARENTAL EXERCISE OF CONSENT—
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES
The art. 8(1) requirement of parental consent for children under the thresh-
old age also complies with the evolving “capacities concept” embodied in 
the UNCRC, art. 18(1), which obliges States to recognise that parents have 
the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of children. 
Arguably, empowering parents in the GDPR, art. 8(1) to give or withhold 
consent to the processing of their children’s data (when the child is below 
the threshold age) reflects the current practice of parents making decisions 
regarding the schooling or health care of their children that are in “the best 
interests of the child”85 and “consistent with the evolving capacities of the 
child”.86 Thus, the requirement for parental consent to the processing of 
personal data of children deemed to lack capacity is merely an extension of 
the traditional parent/child relationship to the digital era. Theoretically, it 
constitutes an improvement on the current practice of children self-declaring 
or confirming their age to SNSs, since many underage children regularly 
flouted these rules to gain underage access to SNSs. However, two aspects 
of this provision are potentially problematic: low levels of parental digital 
literacy and the practical challenge of obtaining “verifiable” parental consent. 
(i) Low levels of parental digital literacy
The appropriateness of parents, or those with parental responsibility, exer-
cising consent to the processing of children’s data depends on their digital 
literacy. Concern has been expressed that “this legislation is shaped by a 
romanticization of parent-child relationships and an assumption of parental 
knowledge that is laughable.”87 It is often the case that children are more 
“tech savvy” than their parents. Indeed, a U.K. survey found that “more 
than four in ten parents of a child aged 5–15 who goes online … agree 
with the statement: ‘My child knows more about the Internet than I do.’”88 
Plus, as outlined above, most adults do not read privacy policies and those 
that do often struggle to understand them, so many parents are ignorant of 
the privacy risks posed and are arguably not best placed to supervise their 
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children’s access to SNSs or give consent to the processing of children’s 
personal data.89 
Moreover, a new, SNS-related phenomenon—referred to as 
“sharenting”—has emerged in recent years. Sharenting is the use of social 
media by parents to over-share detailed information about their children’s 
lives online, often without their children’s knowledge or consent.90 Arguably, 
parents who engage in “sharenting” are incapable of educating their 
children of the privacy and data protection implications of posting personal 
information on SNSs and therefore are not best placed to supervise their 
children’s SNS activities. 
However, whilst the problem of “sharenting” should not be minimised 
(a case of a teenager suing her parents for sharing embarrassing childhood 
photos on Facebook is ongoing in Austria91), it is important to remember 
that, in law, adults are expected to have the capacity to make informed 
decisions about their own freedom of expression and privacy choices. It 
would not be reasonable to expect lawmakers to establish tribunals to assess 
whether every adult exercising parental responsibility has the capacity to 
understand terms of service and privacy notices every time they, or a child 
under their care, wanted to sign up for a new website or post personal 
information on an SNS, in the same way that it would not be appropriate for 
a State to interfere with other parenting choices (e.g. bedtimes, food choices 
and leisure activities) that parents make for their children. Nevertheless, 
Member States and SNSs have a responsibility to support parents through 
the provision of information to increase their digital literacy, as, in 2013, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child stated that whilst “there is no international 
legally binding instrument on the business sector’s responsibilities … all 
businesses must meet their responsibilities regarding children’s rights and States 
must ensure they do so.”92 Similarly, the UNCRC, art. 18(2) obliges states 
to provide appropriate assistance to parents. 
The GDPR, art. 57(1)(b) attempts to address the digital literacy problem 
by obliging Member States’ supervisory authorities to “promote public 
awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards, and rights 
in relation to processing. Activities addressed specifically to children shall 
receive specific attention.” [Emphasis added.] Additionally, the GDPR, art. 
40 states that Member States, supervisory authorities, the European Data 
Protection Board and the Commission shall “encourage” the creation, by 
bodies representing data controllers, of codes of conduct specifying “the 
information provided to, and the protection of, children, and the manner in 
which the consent of the holders of parental responsibility over children is to 
be obtained”. The development of informative educational campaigns and 
codes of conduct will be key to increasing levels of parental digital literacy. 
 129
(ii) The practical challenge of obtaining “verifiable” consent
The provision that is likely to provide the greatest operational challenge is 
art. 8(2), which states that “[t]he controller shall make reasonable efforts to 
verify in such cases [where a child is under the age of consent] that consent is 
given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking 
into consideration available technology.” [Emphasis added.] 
This provision poses two challenges for SNSs: first, how to reliably 
determine whether a child is over the default age of consent; and, secondly, 
in the case of a child under the default age, how to reliably determine that 
consent was given by a parent (or someone with parental responsibility). 
Problematically, at present, there is no effective framework for child age 
verification in operation across EU Member States,93 nor is there political 
will for age verified databases to be compiled by either public authorities 
or private entities. Mechanisms that allow SNSs to confirm that the person 
who is claiming to be a parent, or to exercise parental responsibility, is over 
18 do exist, but they cannot be used to confirm a parental responsibility link 
to a child. For instance, an adult could provide a copy of their passport or 
driving licence, or their name, address or credit card details to an SNS. These 
details could be checked against records held by official agencies (such as the 
passport office, the DVLA, the electoral register or credit reference agencies) 
to confirm that the details match an existing record for someone over the 
age of 18, but it could not be used to confirm a parental responsibility link 
with a child whose data the SNS seeks to process. 
Thus, whilst parental permission may provide an appropriate and 
effective safeguard for younger children, the focus on parental consent for 
pre-teens and teenagers is likely to prove ineffective as the evidence above 
suggests that they are adept at falsifying age credentials and will have the 
technical wherewithal to falsify parental consent. Until these problems are 
resolved, this aspect of the GDPR will not be effective.
There is another, as yet unresolved, challenge: When the GDPR takes 
effect on 25 May 2018, this provision is also likely to generate confusion 
and conflict between parents and children in countries where the default 
age is raised from a currently lower age, since it is unclear whether it will 
oblige children who had previously been deemed to have the capacity to 
access SNSs to seek parental permission to do so going forward. 
Given the widely known, and as yet unsolved, challenges regarding 
verification of children’s ages and the associated problems of verifying that 
it is in fact a parent or person with parental responsibility who is giving 
consent to the processing of a child’s data, law makers should have taken 
an alternative approach. It would have been better to encourage children 
to provide their true age to SNSs and require SNSs to offer alternative, 
child-friendly services. This could have been done, for example, by offering 
 130
platforms to facilitate expression and socialisation by children and permit 
SNSs to collect performance data from children without parental permission 
so as to enhance the service offered, but mandate that no profiling and 
tracking of children’s data can be conducted for commercial purposes. 
C.  DATAFICATION OF RELATIONSHIPS, 
PROFILING & ADVERTISING REVISITED 
On a positive note, the GDPR has attempted to address the problem of 
datafication of relationships through the inclusion of a right of erasure (also 
referred to as a right to be forgotten).94 Notably, this right embodies the 
evolving capacities principle by recognising that as children reach maturity 
and develop a greater sense of privacy, they may wish to withdraw consent 
to some previous disclosures of personal information continuing to be avail-
able. The GDPR states that—
“[t]hat right is relevant in particular where the data subject has 
given his or her consent as a child and is not fully aware of the 
risks involved by the processing, and later wants to remove such 
personal data, especially on the internet. The data subject should 
be able to exercise that right notwithstanding the fact that he or 
she is no longer a child.”95
Behavioural advertising and profiling of children are also prohibited in 
recital 38—which states that “specific protection should, in particular, ap-
ply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing 
or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data 
with regard to children when using services offered directly to a child”—and 
recital 71—which states that children should not be the subject of profiling. 
This accords with an opinion issued by the Article 29 Working Party that 
children should not be exposed to behavioural advertising and profiling.96 
Whilst the prohibition on online behavioural advertising and profiling are 
welcome developments, further steps will have to be taken to ensure their 
success. For instance, clear policy guidelines will need to be issued and 
enforcement mechanisms will need to be used. Given the lack of effective 
age-verification measures, ensuring that children under the threshold age 
are not exposed to age inappropriate advertisements or subject to profiling 
will not be an easy task. It will require close, on-going, co-operation between 
SNSs and third party advertisers. 
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, the GDPR is a positive development, in that it is the first 
EU legal measure that seeks to afford specific privacy and data protection 
to children whilst also legitimising the processing of their personal data 
so that data controllers and third parties can realise its economic value in 
furtherance of the goals of the Digital Single Market. However, the result is 
an inherent and unresolvable tension between fostering economic objectives 
and ensuring that fundamental rights are not eroded. 
The GDPR provides a legal and regulatory framework that is 
conceptually compatible with UNCRC and the EU Charter. Specifically, 
it recognises children as both being and becoming rights holders, and seeks 
to gives effect to the evolving capacities model of children’s rights. It does 
this by stipulating that young children lack the capacity to consent to the 
processing of personal data and that the supervision of children’s access 
to SNSs is a natural duty of modern-day parents, whilst also recognising 
that older children, who have the capacity to make decisions regarding the 
privacy implications of the disclosure of their personal data, need both 
privacy from their parents and assistance from SNSs to comprehend privacy 
notices and unambiguously consent to the processing of their personal data. 
However, there are some problematic aspects to the GDPR. First, 
allowing member states to fix the threshold age between 13–16 years is 
conceptually incoherent. A regulation that seeks to give effect to children’s 
evolving capacities for decision-making should be guided by expert advice 
on children’s capacities, rather than set ages according to Member States’ 
preferences. Thus, a key recommendation of this chapter is that the European 
Commission and/or Member States’ supervisory authorities sponsor research 
into children’s interaction with SNS’s privacy notices and their capacity to 
understand privacy notices, information regarding profiling, advertising and 
advergames—and then use the findings to fix a minimum threshold age 
of capacity to consent to the processing of personal data in member states.
Fixing a uniform threshold age of consent in all Member States would 
have the additional benefit of reducing the compliance burden for SNSs 
operating on a transnational basis that would otherwise be obliged to alter 
their terms and conditions and age verification mechanisms in different 
Member States. It would also minimise the attendant supervisory problems 
for national supervisory authorities. 
The GDPR requires Member States, SNS data controllers and parents 
to take practical steps to give effect to the provisions regarding verified 
consent. Success will depend on the development of a low-cost age-
verification process capable of being integrated into SNSs that operate on 
a transnational basis. This is where other unresolved challenges lie: How to 
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improve the digital literacy of parents and how to enforce verifiable age and 
consent provisions. The current practice of children (and children assisted 
by parents) providing false age details to SNSs will not end unless the digital 
literacy of parents and children increases. Likewise, parents will only be in a 
position to give consent to the processing of their children’s data if they are 
digitally literate and possess the requisite knowledge to understand terms of 
service and privacy notices. Overcoming these challenges will require close 
cooperation and dialogue between national data protection regulator, SNS 
owners and related industry representatives, and child protection experts. 
Until then, the GDPR should be viewed as a welcome but only partially 
successful legal measure.
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